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Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will -
Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?
I. INTRODUCTION
Employees in this country fall into two basic categories: those
who are employed in the public sector and those who are employed
in the private sector. Workers in the private sector may be further
divided according to whether or not they work under a collective
bargaining agreement. These distinctions are especially important
when determining the protections available to discharged employ-
ees. Discharges of public employees are governed by civil service
provisions, which generally allow dismissal of a public employee
only for "just cause."1 Public employees also enjoy constitutional
protection from unjust dismissals.2 Employees in the private sector
who are covered by collective bargaining agreements also usually
are protected from termination by "just cause" provisions in their
union negotiated contracts.3 Workers in the private sector who are
not covered by these agreements are not guaranteed any protection
comparable to that afforded public employees or unionized em-
ployees. Instead they must negotiate their employment contracts
individually if they wish to obtain protection from arbitrary dis-
missals. Absent such protection, the employee risks that a court
will characterize his contract as terminable at will.
Contracts terminable at will can arise in two situations. The
contract may expressly state that it is terminable at will, or the
contract may fail to state that it is for a definite duration. In the
latter case the employment at will doctrine may be applied.4 The
1. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1816 & n.1 (1980).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. American courts have adopted at least three different approaches to interpret con-
tracts for an indefinite duration. The majority of courts will apply the doctrine of at will
employment and find the contracts terminable at will. See note 5 infra and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the other approaches, see note 30 infra.
This Note follows the common practice of referring to this doctrine as the employment
at will doctrine, the terminable at will doctrine, and the at will doctrine. The employment
contract in this context is referred to as a contract terminable at will, an at will contract,
and an employment at will contract. Similarly, this Note refers to the employee under such
an arrangement as a terminable at will employee and an at will employee. In all instances,
these characterizations refer to the employment at will doctrine and its role in defining the
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:201
doctrine states that an employment contract for an indefinite term
is considered a contract terminable at will by either party unless
some other provision in the contract limits the right of either party
to terminate.5
The number of employees in this country who could be fired
at will is enormous. In 1976 approximately sixty to sixty-five per-
cent of a nonagricultural workforce of eighty million was employed
under employment contracts terminable at will.6 Based on figures
released by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, one
commentator has estimated that between 6000 and 7500 employees
under contracts terminable at will are discharged each year for rea-
sons that arbitrators would find unjustifiable.7
Although the employment at will doctrine has been a part of
employment relationships since the late nineteenth century,8 it has
received much criticism in recent years9 and exceptions to this rule
rights of employers and employees as first articulated by H.G. Wood in 1877. See text ac-
companying note 28 infra.
5. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958) defines the doctrine of at will
employment: "Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ
and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon notice by
either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse of time
or by supervening events."
9 S. WLLiSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1967) (footnotes omitted) states,
Where the contract is not for a fixed term, and is, therefore, terminable at will,
though such notice as the nature of the contract made reasonable might be necessary,
there seems no general principle analogous to that in the law of tenancies at will re-
quiring notice of a certain length of time.
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 32, Illustration 1 (1932). See also, 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1960); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1932).
For cases holding that an employment contract is terminable at will, see Annot., 62
A.L.R.3d 271 (1975).
6. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1979).
7. Id. at 9-10.
8. H.G. Wood articulated the rule in his treatise on master-servant relationships. H.
WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (2d ed. 1886); see text accompanying note 28 infra.
9. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Peck, supra note 6;
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481 (1976); Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22d AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (1970); Comment, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Ter-
minable at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REV. 729 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Wrongful Discharge]; Note, Job Security for the At Will Employee:
Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 697 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Job Security]; Note, supra note 1; Comment, Limiting the Employer's Absolute
Right of Discharge: Can Kansas Courts Meet the Challenge?, 29 KAN. L. REV. 267 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Absolute Right]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
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have developed. For example, legislatures have passed numerous
laws that protect employees from discharge.10 Beyond specific stat-
utory exceptions to the terminable at will rule, many state courts
have developed a public policy exception that restricts the em-
ployer's common-law right to dismiss his employees at will." By
STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Implied Contract].
10. For example, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3)
(1976), prohibits discharges in retaliation for union organizing activity. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), prohibits employee terminations which dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Specific federal protec-
tions against retaliatory discharges include the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1674(a) (1976) (prohibiting discharges of those whose wages are garnished for indebtedness);
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976) (discharge of those exercising
rights under the Act is illegal); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976) (protecting older workers from retaliatory discharge); the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976) (illegal to discharge anyone
exercising rights under the Act); 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976) (granting returning veterans the
right to return to former job and prohibiting discharge for one year).
State legislatures have also provided some protection for at will employees. Several
states have statutes prohibiting discharges based upon political activity. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975). For a collection of state laws regarding firing for
political activity, see [1980] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws) 1 43,045. Some states prohibit
discharges because of physical handicaps. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a) (West Supp.
1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
363.03, Subd. 1(2) (West Supp. 1981). A few states do not permit employers to take action
against employees for serving as jurors or for indicating their availability as jurors-e.g.,
Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Vermont. For a collection of state laws re-
garding dismissal for serving on a jury, see [1980] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws)
43,035, 43,055. Other states prohibit discharges for refusal to take a lie detector test--e.g.,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Washington. For a collection of relevant state laws, see [1980] LAB. L. REP. (CCH)
(State Laws) 43,055. Another common provision in state laws is a prohibition against retal-
iatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim. See, e.g., Tsx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ch. 3 (1966); Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair
Employment Practices Legislation I: Employers, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 907 (1967).
11. Courts in at least 12 states have adopted the public policy exception to the at will
doctrine. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 IlM. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. App.
1981); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58,
417 A.2d 505 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
Courts in at least 13 states have indicated that they might adopt the public policy ex-
ception to the at will doctrine under appropriate facts. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117
Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681
(1980); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978);
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creating a public policy exception to this doctrine, these courts
have recognized causes of action for wrongful discharge" by work-
ers formerly employed under terminable at will contracts.1" Dis-
charges that these courts have subjected to the public policy ex-
ception are of four types:1 (1) discharges for refusing to violate a
criminal statute;15 (2) discharges for exercising a statutory right;' 6
(3) discharges for fulfilling a statutory duty; 7 and (4) discharges in
violation of a general public policy.'8 Most critics of the employ-
ment at will doctrine have praised these exceptions to the com-
mon-law rule and have encouraged the courts to abolish the rule.
One of the justifications for these exceptions most often asserted
by critics of the doctrine is the need to protect the employee who
does not have bargaining power equal to that of his employer.1'
Terminable at will employees in the private sector are undoubtedly
vulnerable to unredressed wrongful discharges. Nevertheless,
courts should- avoid further expansion of the public policy excep-
tion to the employment at will doctrine because of the adverse ef-
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Abrisz v. Pulley
Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220
Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977);
Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308,
299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d
737 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979); Roberts v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372,
290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
Courts in only four states have specifically rejected the public policy exception to the at
will doctrine. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Catania v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley
Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244
S.E.2d 272 (1978).
12. While some courts state that a cause of action in this situation is for "wrongful
discharge," other courts use the terms "unfair discharge" or "retaliatory discharge."
Throughout this Note these terms are used interchangeably.
13. See part III infra. This Note does not differentiate between whether an employee's
cause of action for his discharge lies in contract or in tort. The distinction can be important
because under a tort theory the employer could be liable for punitive damages. For a discus-
sion of the different natures of the employee's claims, see Wrongful Discharge, supra note 9,
at 740-42 and cases cited therein; Note, supra note 1, at 1843-44.
14. The public policy exception cases were first broken down into these four categories
in Wrongful Discharge, supra note 9, at 730.
15. See notes 45-47 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 48-57 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 58-69 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 70-110 infra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981). See also Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); Blades, supra note 9; Job Security, supra
note 9; Note, supra note 1; Absolute Right, supra note 9; Implied Contract, supra note 9.
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fects that such expansion may have on the employer-employee re-
lationship, productive efficiency, and the judicial process.
This Note examines the extent to which courts should apply
the public policy exception to abrogate the common-law right of an
employer to terminate at will. Although some limits must be
placed upon employers in order to protect those employees who
lack adequate bargaining power, this Note proposes that the courts
should strike a balance among the interests of the employer, the
employee, and society. This balance can be achieved by limiting
the public policy exception to those instances in which an em-
ployee is discharged in contravention of a legislatively articulated
public policy. This approach would achieve equitable results since
both employers and employees would be on notice of clearly de-
fined reasons for which an employee .absolutely may not be
discharged.
Part II of this Note traces the development of the at will doc-
trine in this country. The next part discusses the judicially created
public policy exception. Part IV examines the ramifications of the
use of the public policy exception upon employers. Finally, in part
V this Note proposes an approach that will accommodate the in-
terests of both the employee and the employer.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Under the common law, if a contract for employment specified
its duration the courts would enforce the intentions of the parties
regarding the length of the employment.20 If the employer retained
the employee beyond the original term the courts usually implied a
renewal for an identical period.2' If the contract, however, failed to
set forth the duration of the employment, the courts determined
the rights of the employer and the employee.
The rights of the employer and the employee under the En-
glish common law evolved from the Statute of Labourers, which
provided that "no master can put away his servant"22 and that ap-
20. See, e.g., Egbert v. Sun Co., 126 F. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1903); Jones v. Graham & Morton
Transp. Co., 51 Mich. 539, 16 N.W. 893 (1883); Linton v. Unexcelled Fire-Works Co., 124
N.Y. 533, 27 N.E. 406 (1891). See also C. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 159 (2d ed. 1913).
21. See, e.g., McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 A. 176 (1887); Fitch v.
Martin, 74 Neb. 538, 104 N.W. 1072 (1905); Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143
(1891); Kelly v. Carthage Wheel Co., 62 Ohio St. 598, 57 N.E. 984 (1900); Norfolk Hosiery &
Underwear Mills Co. v. Westheimer, 121 Va. 130, 92 S.E. 922 (1917). See also Note, Em-
ployment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107 (1942).
22. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (1969).
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prentices could be discharged only "on reasonable cause. ''2  The
English courts carried forward the spirit of the Statute of
Labourers after its repeal by presuming that a general hiring4 was
intended to serve as an employment contract for one year. 5 If the
employment continued for longer than one year the relationship
could be terminated only at the end of an additional year.26 The
early American courts adopted the English approach. In the late
1800s, however, American law departed from.this approach, and
the United States courts developed their own common-law rule for
determining the duration of a disputed employment contract.
In 1877 H.G. Wood's treatise on master-servant relationships
articulated what became the American employment at will
doctrine:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie
a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the
burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no pre-
sumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for
whatever time the party may serve.2 8
Although the basis of "Wood's Rule" has been persuasively chal-
lenged, 9 it has become the primary doctrine governing employ-
ment duration in this country.30 Commentators suggested that one
23. Id. at 426.
24. The English term "general hiring" is the equivalent of the American term "indefi-
nite hiring"-an employment relationship with no specific duration. Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469
(1921).
25. C. LABATT, supra note 20, § 156. See, e.g., Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026
(K.B. 1834); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at 425.
26. Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep. 786 (C.P. 1827).
27. P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, 133 (1969). See, e.g., Adams v.
Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857); Bascom
v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882).
28. H. WOOD, supra note 8, § 134.
29. Wood cited three cases which supposedly supported his rule: Wilder v. United
States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871); De Briar v. Minturn,
1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870). H. WOOD, supra note
8, § 136, at 283 n.5. Commentators have severely questioned the soundness of this support.
See, e.g., Summers, supra note 9, at 485; Job Security, supra note 9, at 699-700; Implied
Contract, supra note 9, at 341 nn.53 & 54.
30. Annot., supra note 24, at 470. See also C. LABATT, supra note 20, § 159. The lead-
ing early case citing Wood's Rule is Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E.
416 (1895). See also Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908);
Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156 (1879); Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889);
Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. (1 Penne.) 581, 43 A. 609 (1899); Faulkner v. Des
Moines Drug Co., 117 Iowa 120, 90 N.W. 585 (1902); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Harvey, 99 Ky.
157, 34 S.W. 1069 (1896); McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 A. 176 (1887);
Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A.A. Ry., 135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W. 756 (1904); Finger v. Koch &
206 [Vol. 35:201
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of the reasons the common-law courts in this country adopted
Wood's Rule so swiftly was to facilitate economic and industrial
development during the industrial revolution s' in accordance with
the prevalent economic ideology of laissez faire and freedom of
Schilling Brewing Co., 13 Mo. App. 310 (1883); Capron v. Strout, 11 Nev. 304 (1876).
Although they did not prevail, two other approaches to the employment of indefinite
duration question appeared in the early American cases. The first of these approaches found
the contractual rate of compensation for the employee to be determinative of the intended
duration of the employment. A stipulation of pay in terms of a fixed amount per week,
month, year, or other period furnished the basis for an inference that the employment was
for a definite term equal to the pay period. See, e.g., Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison, 128
Ark. 260, 194 S.W. 25 (1917); Rosenberger v. Pacific Coast Ry., 111 Cal. 313, 43 P. 963
(1896); Magarahan v. Wright & Lamkin, 83 Ga. 773, 10 S.E. 584 (1889); Alkire v. Orchard
Co., 79 W. Va. 526, 91 S.E. 384 (1917). This analysis has also appeared in more recent cases.
See, e.g., Lowenstein v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 319 F. Supp. 1096 (D.C.
Mass. 1970) (applying Massachusetts law) (annual pay is some evidence supporting finding
of definite term employment); Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951) (weekly
pay indicates definite employment for one week). But cf. Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22
Ill. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355 (1959) (the period for which compensation is to be earned
does not, by itself, create a presumption that the parties intended the hiring to be for other
than an indefinite period); Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. 1, 530 P. 2d 984
(1974) (same). The rationale behind this first approach-that the intent of the parties is
reflected in the units of time when compensation is made-simply does not withstand analy-
sis. One who chooses to be paid hi-weekly rather than monthly probably does so simply to
spread out one's flow of income. Likewise, the employer probably chooses a payment scheme
simply to facilitate his accounting procedures. It is doubtful that either party's choice of pay
periods reflects an intention regarding the duration of the employment contract. This ap-
proach represents a judicial attempt to avoid the harshness of the employment at will rule,
not an adequate solution that carefully balances the interests of the parties involved.
A second alternative approach employed by some early courts considered the circum-
stances surrounding the employment to determine the parties' intent regarding the duration
of employment. The early leading cases espousing this approach include Smith v. Theobald,
86 Ky. 141, 5 S.W. 394 (1887); Maynard v. Royal Worchester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1, 85
N.E. 877 (1908); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Bascom v. Shillito, 37
Ohio St. 431 (1882). To determine the intentions of the parties the courts applying this
approach look for distinguishing features in the contract and provisions or considerations
beyond the services to be rendered. Among the elements found by these courts to reflect the
intentions of the parties that a contract not be at will are the following: the length of time
for which the employee has worked for his employer, Prussing v. General Motors Corp., 403
Mich. 366, 269 N.W.2d 181 (1978), and an employer's promises of job security, which could
have been relied upon by the employee to his detriment, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). For other cases applying this minority ap-
proach, see Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Drzewiecki
v. H&R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972). See also 3A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1960). This approach is not analyzed in this Note because it,
like the first approach, is a means of avoiding the finding that a contract is terminable at
will and of providing the courts a pretext with which to establish a specific duration for the
employment contract. The focus of this Note is on how courts have limited the employer's
ability to terminate after it has been established that an at will cofitract exists.
31. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 9, at 484-86; Job Security, supra note 9, at 700;
Note, supra note 1, at 1824-36; Absolute Right, supra note 9, at 268; Implied Contract,
supra note 9, at 342-43, 346-47.
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contract. Within this framework Wood's Rule seemed equitable:
terminable at will employment provided the employer the flex-
ibility to control his workplace through the unfettered power to
discharge at will and the employee the freedom to resign if he
found more favorable employment or if working conditions became
intolerable.
The terminable at will concept became so important that it
took on constitutional dimensions. In Adair v. United States32 the
United States Supreme Court struck down a federal statute that
barred the discharge of a railroad employee for union membership
on the grounds that the statute interfered both with the liberty to
contract and with property rights guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment.33 Seven years later in Coppage v. Kansas 4 the Court, rely-
ing on Adair, declared that a Kansas statute which prohibited em-
ployers from demanding, as a condition of employment, that their
employees not be members of unions violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.35
Not until the late 1930s, when American industry was firmly
entrenched and the country was recovering from the Depression,
did the Supreme Court first begin to retreat from the rigid termi-
nable at will doctrine. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.36
the Court upheld Congress' power to protect union activity, recog-
nizing that the government's responsibility to ameliorate economic
distress could justify the imposition of restrictions on an em-
32. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
33. Id. at 174-76. The Court stated,
While . . . the rights of liberty and property guaranteed by the Constitution
against deprivation without due process of law, is subject to such reasonable restraints
as the common good or the general welfare may require, it is not within the functions
of government. . . to compel any person in the course of his business and against his
will to accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel any person,
against his will, to perform personal services for another. The right of a person to sell
his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor
from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employ6 to quit the service of the
employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of such employ6. . . . In the absence . . . of a
valid contract between the parties controlling their conduct towards each other and
fixing a period of service, it cannot be. . . that an employer is under any legal obliga-
tion, against his will, to retain an employ6 in his personal service any more than an
employ6 can be compelled, against his will, to remain in the personal service of
another.
Id.
34. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
35. Id. at 11-13.
36. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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ployer's autonomy. While the Court acknowledged that employers
had a legitimate interest in conducting their businesses smoothly,
the Court also noted that employees had the correlative right to
organize.37 The Court, however, observed that Congress had lim-
ited the power of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
to the protection of this right to organize and ruled that the Board
could not interfere generally with the employer's freedom in hiring
and firing: "[T]he Board is not entitled to make its authority a
pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right
is exercised for other reasons than [antiunion] intimidation and
coercion. ' ' 88
Although the Supreme Court in Jones & Laughlin retreated
somewhat from the absolute position that Congress and the states
could not interfere with an employer's hiring and firing decisions,9
that decision nonetheless continued to recognize the importance of
the employer's ability to terminate employees at will. Other New
Deal cases continued to support the employer's ability to choose
their employees as long as they did not violate a statutory provi-
sion designed to protect employees. For example, in J.L Case Co.
v. NLRB,40 in which the defendant company had been accused of
refusing to bargain collectively in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he employer, ex-
cept as restricted by the collective agreement itself and except that
he must engage in no unfair labor practice or discrimination, is
free to select those he will employ or discharge. ' '4 1
These labor cases illustrate that despite the change in eco-
37. Id. at 43-44.
38. Id. at 45.
39. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941), the Court noted that
Adair and Coppage had been sapped of their usefulness.
40. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
41. Id. at 335. See also Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). In Associated
Press a union filed charges that Associated Press, in violation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, had fired one of its employees because of his involvement in union activities. The
Court noted,
The act does not compel the petitioner to employ anyone; it does not require that
the petitioner retain in its employ an incompetent editor or one who fails faithfully to
edit the news to reflect the facts without bias or prejudice. The act permits a discharge
for any reason other than union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with em-
ployees. The restoration of Watson to his former position in no sense guarantees his
continuance in petitioner's employ. The petitioner is at liberty, whenever occasion may
arise, to exercise its undoubted right to sever his relationship for any cause that seems
to it proper save only as a punishment for, or discouragement of, such activities as the
act declares permissible.
Id. at 132.
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nomic and social conditions since the early 1900s the Supreme
Court remained sensitive to the employer's right to terminate em-
ployees. This concern has persisted. As recently as 1961 the Court
distinguished the ability of the federal government to discharge
employees, which is circumscribed by constitutional protections,
from "the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private em-
ployer. '4 2 Similarly, lower courts continued to recognize the doc-
trine of at will employment throughout the 1960s.4s In the past
twelve years, however, critics have sought to modify the rule."
Some courts have responded by developing a public policy excep-
tion to the at will doctrine.
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
One of the most important limits that some state courts have
placed upon the employer's ability to terminate employees at will
is the public policy exception. The circumstances in which the em-
ployer's right to discharge has been judicially limited under the
public policy rubric may be divided into four categories. First,
some courts have found the terminable at will doctrine inappropri-
ate when employees are discharged for refusing to violate a crimi-
nal statute. Second, courts have applied the exception when em-
ployees have been discharged for exercising a statutory right.
Third, a group of courts has invoked the exception to protect em-
ployees terminated for complying with a statutory duty. Last, in
some circumstances courts have intervened on behalf of discharged
employees, citing as authority the general public policy of the
state.
A. Discharge for Refusing to Violate a Criminal Statute
The leading case denying an employer's right to terminate an
42. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897 (1961).
43. For cases applying the rule up until the 1970s, see Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428
F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970); Entis v. Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1964);
Beeler v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 169 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 903
(1949); Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Swaffield v. Uni-
versal Ecsco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 76 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1969); Wilson v. Red Bluff Daily
News, 237 Cal. App. 2d 87, 46 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1965); Gressley v. Williams, 193 Cal. App. 2d
636, 14 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1961); Russel & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Carfizzi v. United Transp. Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 707, 247 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1964);
Winslow v. Roberts Numbering Mach. Co., 17 Misc. 2d 18, 183 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct.
1959). Part III of this Note examines cases in the last decade that have developed excep-
tions to the employment at will doctrine.
44. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
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at will employee for refusing to obey his employer's instructions
that he violate a criminal statute is Petermann v. Teamsters Local
396.45 In Petermann the employee, subpoenaed to testify at a legis-
lative hearing, was instructed by his employer to commit perjury at
the hearing. The employee, however, testified truthfully and was
discharged the next day. The California Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's ruling that the employee failed to state a cause of
action. The court recognized that because the employment con-
tract had no fixed duration, the employee, as a general rule, could
be terminated at will by the employer. The court, however, noted
that this general rule could be limited by statute.
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public
policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee
... on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act
specifically enjoined by statute. . . . [I]n order to more fully effectuate the
state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the em-
ployer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employ-
ment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the
employee's refusal to commit perjury."
Since Petermann other jurisdictions have allowed at will employ-
ees to sue for wrongful discharge when fired for refusing to violate
a criminal statute.47
45. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
46. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (emphasis added).
47. The California Supreme Court recognized an employee's cause of action when he
alleged that he was discharged for refusing to participate in an alleged price-fixing scheme
in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980). Tameny's complaint alleged that ARCO's district manager and others engaged in a
combination "for the purpose of reducing, controlling, stabilizing, fixing, and pegging the
retail gasoline prices of Arco service station franchisees." Id. at 170, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 840.
In Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978), the
court adopted the public policy exception when an a employee challenged his discharge for
refusing to falsify state pollution control reports. The court stated, "It is without question
that the public policy of this state does not condone attempts to violate its duly enacted
laws.. . . [Falsifying pollution reports] would clearly violate the law of this state." Id. at
495-96, 265 N.W.2d at 388.
A New Jersey court recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge when an X-ray
technician, employed under a terminable at will contract, alleged that his release resulted
from his refusal to perform unauthorized catheterizations in O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.
Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978). The opinion emphasized that the State Medical
Practice Act prohibited all but licensed nurses from performing catheterizations. The court
stated that "an employment at will may not be terminated by an employer in retaliation for
an employee's refusal to perform an illegal act. This rule is especially cogent where the
subject matter is the administration of medical treatment, an area in which the public has a
foremost interest. . . ." Id. at 418, 390 A.2d at 150.
A Connecticut court recognized an employee's cause of action when he alleged that his
discharge was the result of informing his employer that some packaged goods were mislabel-
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B. Discharge For Exercising a Statutory Right
Some jurisdictions recognize a cause of action by at will em-
ployees who are discharged for exercising a statutory right
designed to protect employees within the employment relationship.
Typical of these cases is the recurring situation of an at will em-
ployee discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim. Some
courts have ruled that these discharged employees do not have a
cause of action because most workers' compensation statutes pro-
vide the exclusive civil remedy against the employer.48 The first
case to afford a cause of action for an employee discharged for
filing a workers' compensation claim was Frampton v. Central In-
diana Gas Co.49 In Frampton the employee filed a workers' com-
pensation claim after receiving a work-related injury. The em-
ployee received a settlement and one month later she was fired.
When the employee brought suit alleging retaliatory discharge the
trial court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court of Indiana re-
versed the lower court, reasoning that to deny a cause of action
would defeat the humane purposes of the workers' compensation
act. The court stated,
The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for
work-related injuries . . . and a right in the employee to receive such com-
pensation. But in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for public
policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right in an
unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal. If employers are permit-
ted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims, a most
important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being discharged
would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right.50
Since Frampton other jurisdictions have split on the question
led in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). Had the
employee remained silent about this violation of the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act he would have been subject to criminal sanctions under CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19-215 (West 1977). The court stated that "an employee should not be put to an
election whether to risk criminal sanction or to jeopardize his continued employment." 179
Conn. at 480, 427 A.2d at 389. But see Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831
(D.C. 1981) (denying petition for rehearing of dismissal of employee's cause of action alleg-
ing that he had been fired for testifying contrary to his employer's interest).
48. See, e.g., Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Raley v. Darling
Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950). This argument does not with -
stand analysis because while the workers' compensation statutes may provide the exclusive
civil remedy against the employer for work-related injuries, an employee can assert other
civil remedies arising out of circumstances that do not involve employment injuries. See
notes 52-56 infra and accompanying text.
49. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
50. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427 (emphasis in original).
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of whether an employer may fire an employee for filing a workers'
compensation claim.51 Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.52 is representative
of the decisions that have found dismissal under such circum-
stances to be improper. Despite a dissent urging that the creation
of a new tort be left to the legislature,53 the court in Kelsay fo-
cused on the remedial nature of the state's workers' compensation
act and refused to allow the employer's common-law right under
the terminable at will doctrine to defeat the legislative intent be-
hind the act. The employer in Kelsay argued that the legislature's
decision to provide only criminal sanctions against an employer
who threatened to discharge an employee for exercising his rights
and remedies under the act precluded the plaintiff's civil action.5 4
The court, however, recognized that the practical effect of disal-
lowing an action for retaliatory discharge would be to force injured
employees to choose between exercising their statutory rights or
maintaining their jobs. The Kelsay court predicted that most em-
ployees would opt for the latter choice and thus would be left with-
out a remedy for their workers' compensation claims. Placing em-
ployees in such a dilemma would, in effect, relieve the employers of
a responsibility expressly placed upon them by the legislature.55
The court also rejected the employer's argument that the workers'
compensation act provided the exclusive remedy available to the
plaintiff and thus precluded any related civil cause of action. The
court noted that the exclusive remedy provision of the act limited
recovery by employees to work-related injuries,5 but the plaintiff's
action concerned her discharge and did not seek additional com-
51. At least five state courts have applied the public policy exception to the at will
doctrine when an employee is discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim: Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151
(1976); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 85
N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
At least seven state courts have refused to extend the public policy exception to at will
employees discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim: Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d
708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); John-
son v. National Bed Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Stephens v. Justiss-
Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1974); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.
2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Dockery v.
Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978).
52. 74 11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979).
53. Id. at 190, 384 N.E.2d at 361 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
54. Id. at 180, 384 N.E.2d at 356.
55. Id. at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
56. Id. at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
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pensation for her injury.
Courts that have refused to recognize an exception to the at
will doctrine in the workers' compensation setting have not demon-
strated the incisive analysis exhibited in Kelsay. These courts typi-
cally defer to the legislature and insist that it is best suited to cre-
ate new causes of action. Rather than acknowledging the hindrance
their decisions will impose on the effectuation of the legislative
purpose, these courts are hesitant to support the goals of the work-
ers' compensation acts absent express legislative authorization."
C. Discharge for Fulfilling a Statutory Duty
Some jurisdictions have extended the public policy exception
to situations in which the employee is terminated for complying
with a statutory duty. In Nees v. Hocks,58 one of the first cases to
recognize a cause of action under these circumstances, the em-
ployee previously had been called for jury duty but received a one
year postponement. When the court recalled the employee, her em-
ployers indicated that although they could spare her "for awhile,"
they could not afford to have her away from her job for one
month.59 They encouraged her to ask to be dismissed from jury
duty. When the employers learned that their employee had not
sought to be excused they fired her.
Citing Petermann, Frampton, and Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co.,6O the Nees court recognized that an employer's right to termi-
nate an at will employee is not completely unfettered. The court
found that countervailing community interests imposed restraints
on an employer's ability to dismiss his employee. Nees cited the
state constitution61 and state statutes enacted to implement the
57. See, e.g., Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 297, 244 S.E.2d 272,
275 (1978), in which the court concluded that "[flf the General Assembly of North Carolina
had intended a cause of action be created, surely, . . . it would have specifically addressed
the problem." Dockery articulated the traditional negative implication rationale invoked by
the courts: "[T]he failure of the General Assembly to specifically provide the claim for relief
alleged by the plaintiff was an indication of its intent that no such claim be created." Id. at
300, 244 S.E.2d at 277.
58. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
59. Apparently the employee was obligated to make herself available for jury duty for
one month.
60. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); see notes 70-81 infra and accompanying text.
61. 272 Or. at 218-19, 536 P.2d at 516. OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 provides that litigants
must be afforded jury trials in civil cases. Id. art. I, § 11 guarantees a defendant a right to
trial by jury in all criminal cases. Id. art. VH, § 5 provides, "The Legislative Assembly shall
so provide that the most competent of the permanent citizens of the county shall be chosen
for jurors."
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constitutionally guaranteed jury system"2 as the primary authori-
ties for this public policy. The court also referred to judicial and
legislative determinations in other jurisdictions that held employ-
ers in contempt of court when they had fired employees for serving
on juries.6 s The court, therefore, held the defendant employers lia-
ble for discharging their employee for serving on a jury.6 4
Pennsylvania also has recognized a cause of action for an at
will employee discharged for serving on a jury. Unlike the Nees
court, the court in Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc."5 relied
solely upon its state's constitution and statutes as sources of the
public policy.6 Although the court recognized the general rule that
no nonstatutory cause of action exists for an employer's termina-
tion of an at will employment relationship, the court found that
"where a clear mandate of public policy is violated by termination,
the employer's right to discharge may be circumscribed. '67
Not all jurisdictions, however, have granted a cause of action
62. 272 Or. at 219, 536 P.2d at 516. Among the legislative enactments cited by the
court are provisions that exempt certain persons from jury duty, that provide certain ex-
cuses from jury duty including poor health and old age and when serving would subject a
person to extreme hardship, and that permit deferment of jury duty "for good cause
shown." Another provision cited by the court authorizes the imposition of a fine upon per-
sons who fail to report for jury service. Id.
63. The court cited People v. Vitucci, 49 Il1. App. 2d 171, 199 N.E.2d 78 (1964), and a
Massachusetts statute, 44 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268, § 14A (West 1970). It is unfortu-
nate that the court cited these out of state sources. Certainly these extra-jurisdictional cita-
tions were unnecessary to establish the public policy of Oregon. Reference to Oregon's con-
stitution and statutes was sufficient to establish the exception. Courts should extend the
public policy exception only when a constitutionally or legislatively created public policy of
the forum state is violated by a discharge of an at will employee. When the courts decide for
themselves the parameters of the state's public policy, an atmosphere of uncertainty is cre-
ated because neither employers nor employees know when one judge might decide that cer-
tain conduct is in the best interest of the state. See notes 119-23 infra and accompanying
text.
64. 272 Or. at 219, 536 P.2d at 516.
65. 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
66. Id. at 32, 386 A.2d at 120. The Pennsylvania Constitution provided, "Trial by jury
shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." PA. CONST. art. I, § 36. Penn-
sylvania statutes provided that failure to obey a summons for jury service would be treated
the same as any disobedience to a court summons. Although neither Nees nor Reuther made
the argument, both courts could have recognized the employee's cause of action by using the
Petermann rationale-the employer should not be allowed to use his dismissal authority to
coerce an employee to conduct himself in a manner that would subject him to judicial sanc-
tions. See text accompanying notes 122-23 infra.
The only court decision cited by Reuther to establish public policy was Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice." 255 Pa. Super. Ct. at 33, 386 A.2d at 121 (quoting Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
67. 255 Pa. Super. Ct. at 31, 386 A.2d at 120 (emphasis added).
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to an at will employee discharged for serving on a jury. The same
jurisdiction that rendered the Petermann decision one year later
affirmed a lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action
in Mallard v. Boring. In Mallard plaintiff asserted that serving
on a jury was within the ambit of legislation preventing employers
from firing employees for their political activity. The court, how-
ever, rejected this contention. The Mallard court did not seek to
draw a public policy argument from the state constitution or stat-
utes. Instead, the court declined, absent some statutory authoriza-
tion, to intrude upon the rights of the parties to the at will
contract.6 9
D. Discharge in Violation of General Public Policy
The most expansive application of the public policy exception
has occurred in jurisdictions that have permitted a cause of action
for at will employees discharged in violation of the state's general
public policy. For example, in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.70 the
court could not identify any constitutional or statutory policy to
protect the discharged employee. The court, therefore, devised a
new branch of the exception to the terminable at will doctrine
from its own interpretation of public policy.
The plaintiff, Monge, alleged that she had been promoted to a
higher paying position after her foreman told her that she could
have the job if she would be "nice" to him7 1 and that she was sub-
sequently fired because she refused to date him.72 To support her
claim, Monge produced evidence that the company's personnel
manager had told her that the foreman used his position to make
68. 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
69. The court stated, "[T]he fact is the Legislature has seen fit to enact a statute
affording protection from dismissal as to an election official whereas they have not done so
in the case of jurors." Id. at 396, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
70. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
71. Id. at 131, 316 A.2d at 550.
72. Plaintiff did not bring this action claiming she had been discharged for refusing
the sexual advances of her foreman in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Cf. Tomkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (conditioning female em-
ployee's continued employment upon her submitting to sexual advances of a male supervisor
violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods. Inc., 552
F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (employer policy or acquiescence in practice of compelling female
employees to submit to sexual advances states a cause of action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(complaint alleging discharge for refusing sexual advances of male supervisor states a cause
of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (abolishing female employee's job for refusing her male superior's sexual advances
violated the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972).
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advances on female employees. Monge also presented other evi-
dence to bolster her allegations. Shortly after refusing to date her
foreman, Monge's new job was abolished and she was demoted to a
lower paying position. Then the company terminated her overtime
schedule.7 3 When Monge requested overtime work, her foreman as-
signed her the job of cleaning the restroom. Finally, when she re-
ported some problems with the machine she operated, Monge's
foreman told her that she would have to return to the machine and
handle the problem herself. When she refused to return to the ma-
chine and complained to her union steward, the foreman fired her.
Monge was subsequently reinstated after she complained to her
union. The events which led to Monge's final termination con-
cerned her illness and subsequent absence from work. Monge re-
ceived a letter stating that she was discharged for failing to report
for work for three days without notifying the company.74 She
claimed that she had notified the company that she would be ab-
sent and that her alleged unexcused absence was a mere pretense
for her discharge.
Defendant countered the charges of malice by producing un-
contradicted evidence that Monge's new job had been terminated
and her overtime schedule cancelled because of a shortage in avail-
able work and her low seniority position." Although the demotion
resulted in a decrease in pay, Monge still made more money than
when she started with the company. Defendant conceded that the
foreman asked Monge for a date, but asserted that the request was
an isolated incident and was not pursued. Defendant also demon-
strated that the foreman had given Monge the only extra work
available when she requested overtime work. The evidence also
showed that the foreman had performed some personal favors for
plaintiff.76
Despite defendant's evidence, the jury found for Monge. On
appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, without analyzing the
underlying rationale, recognized the employee's cause of action. Al-
though the court initially noted that the question of limiting the
employer's ability to terminate at will employees required balanc-
73. 114 N.H. at 131, 316 A.2d at 550. The company allegedly did not terminate the
overtime of any other employees.
74. Id. at 131-32, 316 A.2d at 551.
75. Id. at 135, 316 A.2d at 552 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 135, 316 A.2d at 552-53. The foreman, at Monge's request, hired her hus-
band, a mechanic, to work on his automobile. Also, when Monge could not pick up her
Christmas turkey, the foreman personally delivered two turkeys to her home. Id.
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ing the interests of the employer, the employee, and society, the
court did not analyze these competing interests. Relying on
Frampton and Petermann," and thereby recognizing the require-
ment of finding a public policy basis in Monge's claim, the court
stated, "We hold that a termination by the employer of a contract
of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employ-
ment contract."78 At no point in the opinion did the court cite any
constitutional or legislative support for its conclusion of what
should be in the public's best interest. The public policy ostensibly
served by recognition of Monge's claim was not further delineated
by the court. Instead, the court merely used this public policy lan-
gnage to justify its recognition of Monge's claim.79 Thus, the court
limited its review to the question of whether sufficient evidence
could be found to support the jury's finding. Although the dissent
contended that "reasonable men could not find for the plaintiff on
the evidence in this case,"8 0 the majority ruled that the jury's ver-
dict was supported by the evidence."'
77. The court also relied on Professor Blades' influential law review article on employ-
ment at will. See Blades, supra note 9.
78. 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
79. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980), indicates that the
New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Monge represents a judicial attempt to create
a remedy for a plaintiff. In Howard a widow sued her deceased husband's employer alleging
that the employer fired her husband because of his old age and poor health. Relying on
Monge, the widow argued that her husband's discharge had been motivated by bad faith,
malice, or retaliation. The Howard court, however, refused to recognize the widow's cause of
action, noting that a discharge for sickness is usually remedied by medical insurance or
disability provisions in an employment contract while the proper remedy for age discrimina-
tion is provided by statute. Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274. The Howard court's emphasis on
other remedies available to the plaintiff suggests that the court in Monge provided a cause
of action to a plaintiff who would otherwise have been without a remedy.
Earlier in its opinion the New Hampshire Supreme Court attempted to distinguish the
Monge decision from the facts in Howard. The court stated, "We construe Monge to apply
only to a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public
policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would comdemn. A dis-
charge due to sickness does not fall within this category. . . ." Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274
(citations omitted). One commentator has argued that Howard thus narrows the scope of
Monge. Comment, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.: Is the Public Policy Exception to
the At Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the Employment Relationship?, 33 RuTGERS L. REv.
1187, 1191 (1981). While Howard arguably may narrow Monge by requiring some affirmative
action or refusal to act by the employee, the essential holding of Monge survived-the court
maintained its power to articulate what it perceives to be the state's public policy.
80. 114 N.H. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
81. The court affirmed the jury's finding for the plaintiff, but it took exception to the
amount of damages awarded. The jury's award included actual damages for lost pay and
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Monge's departure from clearly articulated constitutional or
statutory authority and its creation of a new branch of the public
policy exception to the terminable at will doctrine became a prece-
dent for other courts that sought to expand the remedies available
to discharged at will employees. One example of such an applica-
tion of Monge is Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.82 Fortune
sold cash registers for the defendant company on a commission ba-
sis. When Fortune refused to retire at age sixty-one the company
discharged him. The court recognized Fortune's status as an at will
employee and that he had received all commissions due under his
contract. The court also acknowledged that under the employment
contract the company faced no further liability to Fortune.8 3 The
court, however, intimated that the company had discharged For-
tune to avoid paying him additional commissions.84 In order to find
any basis for Fortune's claim, the court found it necessary to allow
an inquiry into the employer's motive for terminating the at will
employee. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court thus inter-
preted the public policy exception of the employment at will doc-
trine to include discharges made in bad faith.8 5 The court cited
Monge and stated,
We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to em-
ployment contracts the rule that in every contract there is an implied cove-
nant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of de-
stroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the
contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.86
mental suffering. Noting that Monge's action was in contract and that damages for mental
suffering are unavailable in a contract action, the court remanded for a new trial unless she
would accept damages limited to wages actually lost. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
82. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
83. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
84. Id. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. Under Fortune's contract he received 75% of his
commission if the territory where the cash registers were sold was assigned to him on the
date of the purchase order, 25% if the territory was assigned to him at the date of delivery
and installation, or 100% if the territory was assigned to him at both times. Id. at 97-98, 364
N.E.2d at 1253. Both NCR and Fortune were trying to sell a new line of cash registers to a
customer in Fortune's territory. It is unclear from the opinion whether NCR or Fortune
finally consummated the sale. Fortune received a 75% commission owed to him but he re-
ceived no commission for cash registers that were delivered pursuant to this sale but after
his discharge. Id. at 99, 364 N.E.2d at 1253-54.
85. The Fortune court did not even consider what public policy justifications war-
ranted the bad faith standard. Although Monge did not specifically identify the public pol-
icy that justified its expansion of exceptions to the terminable at will doctrine, the court at
least attempted to base its holding on some notion of public policy. See text accompanying
notes 77-81 supra.
86. 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (emphasis in original).
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The court thus ruled that an allegation of bad faith constitutes a
prima facie case of wrongful discharge.8 7
Other courts have continued to create exceptions to the termi-
nable at will doctrine by forging their own definition of the state's
public policy. Unlike Monge and Fortune, these courts have at
least attempted to rely on statutory authority before recognizing a
cause of action. For example, in Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co."" the employer dismissed an at will employee in a mana-
gerial position for informing law enforcement officials that a fellow
employee might have been violating Illinois criminal statutes and
for agreeing to work with the authorities to gather evidence against
his co-employee. The court first acknowledged the public policy ex-
ception to the at will doctrine. The court then stated that this pub-
lic policy is to be found in the state constitution, statutes, "and,
when they are silent, in its judicial decisions."89 Recognizing that
no specific constitutional or statutory provision required a citizen
to participate in uncovering and prosecuting crimes, the court nev-
ertheless decided that "public policy . . . favors citizen crime-
fighters." 90 The court then employed its own interpretation of the
state's public policy and determined that to allow employers to fire
employees for reporting crimes might deter citizens from volun-
teering information to law enforcement agencies. Because of this
possible deterrence, the court recognized the employee's cause of
action for retaliatory discharge.9 1 At no point did the court balance
the effect of this dismissal on criminal enforcement with the inter-
ests of the employer in discharging the individual.
Harless v. First National Bank92 presented facts similar to
Palmateer when the plaintiff sought damages after his discharge
for reporting violations of state and federal law to his employers.
Harless, a bank employee, became aware that the bank had been
overcharging customers on loans and not making proper rebates, in
87. But see Clink v. Board of County Road Comm'rs, 96 Mich. App. 524, 294 N.W.2d
209 (1980) (action for loss of possible pension benefits denied under public policy exception
to at will doctrine). See also Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(discharged employee allowed cause of action when discharged because his pension was
about to vest). A few other courts have used the good faith standard to extend protection to
discharged employees. See, e.g., Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1977); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974); Zimmer v. Wells Man-
agement Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
88. 85 Il. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
89. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
91. Id.
92. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
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violation of state and federal consumer credit and protection laws.
Harless claimed that his efforts to get the bank to comply with
these laws resulted in his dismissal. The court found that among
those courts that have discussed the public policy exception to the
terminable at will doctrine, a cause of action has generally been
permitted if the employee could show that the discharge contra-
vened "some substantial public policy." 3 Harless found the requi-
site "substantial public policy" in the West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act,94 which was designed to regulate con-
sumer and credit practices. The court then recognized the em-
ployee's cause of action because "[s]uch manifest public policy
should not be frustrated by a holding that an employee of a lend-
ing institution covered by the Act, who seeks to ensure that com-
pliance is being made with the Act, can be discharged without be-
ing furnished a cause of action for such discharge." 5
The Palamateer and Harless decisions presently represent the
minority position. Most courts have not permitted causes of action
by employees discharged for informing enforcement authorities of
employer corruption or criminal activity. For example, at will em-
ployees have been denied relief when discharged for reporting that
a corporate vice president was taking kickbacks,9 for uncovering
evidence of illegal foreign currency manipulations, 97 for reporting
93. Id. at 273. The court noted that while most states required that this expression of
public policy be found in the state's constitution or statutes, Monge and Fortune were rec-
ognized as creating a "broader concept." Id. at 274.
94. Id. at 275; W. VA. CODE, §§ 46A-1-101 to -8-102 (1981).
95. 246 S.E.2d at 276. Harless, unlike Palmateer, did not openly admit that neither
constitutional nor statutory provisions necessarily supported its decision. As in Palmateer,
the employer in Harless did not ask the employee to participate in illegal activity. This fact
distinguishes Harless and Palmateer from the situation presented in Petermann. The plain-
tiff in neither Harless nor Palmateer exercised a statutory right. This fact distinguishes
Harless and Palmateer from Frampton and the other workers' compensation cases in which
the employees exercised rights specifically designed to protect them in the work environ-
ment. Harless flirted with the exception for exercising a statutory right when it discussed
the West Virginia legislation allegedly in issue: "[The act] represents a comprehensive at-
tempt on the part of the Legislature to extend protection to the consumers and persons who
obtain credit in this State and who obviously constitute the vast majority of our adult citi-
zens." Id. at 275-76. The Harless facts, however, are distinguishable from the workers' com-
pensation cases because the consumer credit legislation was not designed to protect the indi-
vidual employee in his capacity as an employee. Because this legislation was not designed
to affect directly the relationships of the parties to an employment contract, Harless cannot
be categorized with those cases concerning employees discharged for exercising a statutory
right discussed in section III(B) supra.
96. Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1979).
97. Edwards v. Citibank, 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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that corporate officers had violated state security laws, 8 and for
possessing knowledge of criminal activity within the employer's
corporations.19
Although the public policy exception has, in some jurisdic-
tions, greatly expanded the circumstances under which an em-
ployee may sue his employer for wrongful or retaliatory discharge,
the new cause of action is not without limits. Generally, even these
expansive decisions have required the employee, as a threshold
test, to demonstrate that the case concerns a matter of public pol-
icy. When only private interests are at stake courts rarely allow the
cause of action. For example, employees have been denied causes
of action for wrongful discharge when fired for questioning an em-
ployer's internal management system100 or his integrity, 0 1 and for
threatening to sue an employer for an injury unrelated to work.102
Similarly, causes of action have been denied employees fired for
taking too much sick leave' 03 and for misusing the company's
Christmas fund.104 Employees dismissed when falsely accused of
stealing from the cash register, 0 5 when their supervisor falsified a
job performance report, 08 and when they refused to take a lie de-
tector test 07 were also denied actions against their former employ-
ers for wrongful discharge. An employee who, in his status as a
shareholder, sought to examine the company's books and, as a re-
sult, was fired, was not allowed to sue the employer. 0 8 Finally,
even in actions seemingly unrelated to the employer, an employee
fired for attending night school 09 and another employee dismissed
for cohabiting with one co-employee while having an affair with a
married co-employee" 0 were denied causes of action for wrongful
discharge.
98. Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
99. O'Neill v. ARA Services, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
100. Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980).
101. Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
102. Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. App. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (1980).
103. Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
104. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977).
105. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
106. Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967).
107. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
108. Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
109. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977).
110. Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. App. 1980).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Although most critics of the employment at will doctrine have
focused on the perceived need for judicial intervention to protect
the employee,"' a thorough analysis of the employee discharge
cases must also include an examination of the legitimate counter-
vailing interests of the employer. Even Monge, the case that
spawned the most liberal application of the public policy excep-
tion, recognized that a balaricing of competing interests is required:
"In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite
term, the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit
must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintain-
ing his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a
proper balance between the two. ' 112 Monge and its progeny, how-
ever, have focused almost exclusively on the concerns of the em-
ployee. These courts, which have allowed discharged employees to
sue their employers for violations of general public policy, have not
considered the effects that their decisions will have on employers.
The judicially created public policy exception to the employ-
ment at will doctrine has allowed a wide range of causes of action
for discharged employees. The courts that have considered dis-
charged at will employees' claims have recognized causes of action
ranging from discharges for refusing to violate a criminal code and
for exercising a statutory right to discharges made in bad faith.1 '
Thus, the permissible scope of a discharged at will employee's
claim depends upon the standard for a prima facie cause of action
the jurisdiction has adopted. One effect of a broad standard is that
it expands the array of facts that will constitute a prima facie case
and, therefore, put an employee's claim before a jury. If an em-
ployee can raise questions of fact sufficient to avoid summary judg-
ment or a directed verdict, his chance of success before the jury is
excellent. Professor Blades, a leading proponent of judicial inter-
vention to protect at will employees, has recognized the propensity
of jurors to sympathize with employees."14 Courts, therefore,
111. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
112. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
113. See part III supra.
114. Blades, supra note 9, at 1428. Professor Blades stated,
[T]here is the danger that the average jury will identify with, and therefore believe, the
employee. This possibility could give rise to vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled employ-
ees fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion. If the potential for vexatious suits
by discharged employees is too great, employers will be inhibited in exercising their
best judgment as to which employees should or should not be retained. . . .[T]he em-
ployer's prerogative to make independent, good faith judgments about employees is
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should carefully balance the interests of the employer, the em-
ployee, and society when they determine the parameters of a prima
facie case of wrongful discharge.
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. is one example of a
court's failure to engage in this analysis. The standard that For-
tune adopted-bad faith-is overly broad. In Fortune the court
recognized that the employee had been discharged under a con-
tract terminable at will and that the employer had fulfilled all du-
ties he owed to the employee. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that terminations made in bad faith constitute a breach of the em-
ployment contract.115 The bad faith standard represents a signifi-
cant departure from the Petermann, Frampton, and Nees stan-
dards. In those cases the discharged at will employees' complaints
alleged that the discharges violated some legislatively articulated
public policy. 16 Under Fortune's bad faith standard, an em-
ployee's cause of action is not restricted by carefully defined stan-
dards. Thus, the employee is not required to prove that the reason
for dismissal violates public policy. The bad faith standard signifi-
cantly eases the employee's burden of bringing an issue of fact
before a sympathetic jury.117
important in our free enterprise system.
Id.
115. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text.
116. In Petermann the employee alleged that he was fired for refusing to commit per-
jury. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. The discharged employee in Frampton
alleged that he was fired because he filed a workers' compensation claim. See notes 49-50
supra and accompanying text. In Nees the employee alleged that she was fired for serving
on a jury. See notes 58-64 supra and accompanying text.
117. The Fortune court stated,
NCR claims that it did not breach the contract, and that it has no further liability to
Fortune. According to a literal reading of the contract, NCR is correct.
However, Fortune argues that, in spite of the literal wording of the contract, he is
entitled to a jury determination on NCR's motives in terminating his services under
the contract and in finally discharging him. We agree.
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (1977)
(footnote omitted).
Some courts have recognized that Fortune's bad faith standard is too broad. See, e.g.,
Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1980). Mag-
nan held that only employer conduct which contained "an aspect of fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation" would meet the "bad faith" test of Fortune. Id. at -, 429 A.2d at 494 (quoting
A. John Cohen Ins. v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 392 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Mass. App. 1979)). The
Magnan test, however, still facilitates the employee's task of presenting an issue of fact so
that the case must be submitted to the jury. Even under its more narrow standard, Magnan
held that an allegation of conduct containing an aspect of fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion presented a material issue of fact so as to preclude a summary judgment. Magnan v.
Anaconda Indus., Inc., 37 Conn. Supp. at -, 429 A.2d at 494. But see Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). In Pierce the court denied a doctor's
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An employer in a jurisdiction that follows Fortune arguably is
faced with the requirement that he may terminate an employee
only for "just cause" since the Fortune court based its bad faith
standard on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
that it found in all employment contracts. If this standard does not
tacitly abolish the common-law terminable at will doctrine, then it
surely has precipitated the erosion of the doctrine's viability. The
court, however, did not discuss what effect it intended its bad faith
standard to have on the common-law rule. Indeed, the court failed
to identify any public policy basis for the bad faith standard it
created. This notable absence of any careful consideration of the
standard's impact on well-recognized principles of law casts doubt
on Fortune's precedential value. 118 A jurisdiction that nevertheless
cause of action for wrongful discharge when she alleged that she had been fired for refusing
to continue research that she felt violated ethical standards and the Hippocratic Oath. Al-
though the court recognized the public policy exception to the terminable at will doctrine,
the court required that this public policy be articulated in a clear mandate. The court
stated,
[T]he [clear mandate of public policy standard] provides a workable means to screen
cases on motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action or for summary judg-
ment. If an employee does not point to a clear expression of public policy, the court can
grant a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 513.
The Fortune court could have ruled on the alternative theory of quantum meruit and
reached the same result without relying on an exception to the employment at will doctrine.
Both Fortune and NCR tried to sell a new line of cash registers to a customer that Fortune
had serviced for six years. Under Fortune's contract NCR could sell cash registers in his
territory and avoid paying him a commission only if the company gave him written notice
before entering his territory. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. at 98, 364
N.E.2d at 1253-54. The opinion intimates that the required notice was not given. Under a
theory of restitution, the court could have asked the jury to determine whether Fortune had
been responsible for selling the cash registers rather than NCR, or whether Fortune had
earned the commission under the terms of his contract since NCR gave no written notice. If
the jury had responded affirmatively to either inquiry and also found that NCR fired For-
tune solely to prevent him from receiving these commissions, the court could have awarded
him relief on a quantum meruit theory. Fortune sought this alternative relief, but because
the court developed a "good faith" theory, id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256, it did not consider
the merits of the restitution theory.
The court instead seized upon the concept of "good faith and fair dealing," id., as the
basis for recognizing Fortune's claim. Even under this standard the court could have recog-
nized that the duties of the parties were embodied in the employment contract. Thus, be-
cause the employment contract was terminable at will, the only duty owed Fortune was to
pay the commissions owed him under the contract. If the employer fulfilled these obliga-
tions, then the employer met the test of "good faith and fair dealing" in firing Fortune.
118. At least one court has recognized that a transformation of all terminable at will
contracts into "just cause" contracts would occur under such a situation when it declined to
follow Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. In Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. App.
1980), the court stated,
We refuse to follow Monge. The effect of adhering to such a rule would be to
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chooses to follow Fortune will virtually ensure that an employee
who can raise an issue of fact concerning his discharge will also be
able to state a cause of action that satisfies a prima facie standard
requiring only bad faith.
A. Uncertainty in the Work Place
Courts that have expanded the public policy exception beyond
the Petermann and Frampton rationales to afford discharged em-
ployees a readily available cause of action have created an atmos-
phere of uncertainty in the work place: neither the employer nor
the employee can be certain that a particular discharge is a viola-
tion of general public policy.'19 This uncertainty has arisen because
of the absence of clearly defined public policy standards by which
to establish the parameters of a proper cause of action.
In Monge the court disallowed discharges "motivated by bad
faith or malice or based on retaliation [because they are] not [in]
the best interest of ... the public good." 2 ° Fortune also held that
at will employees could not be discharged in bad faith. These stan-
dards do not adequately notify the employer or the employee of
what constitutes an impermissible discharge. Because of this
vagueness, an employer may honestly believe he is justified in dis-
charging an employee, while the distraught employee interprets
the dismissal to be in bad faith or in retaliation. Under the stan-
dards adopted in Monge and Fortune such a situation is ripe for
litigation. The employer might be forced to litigate the merits of a
discharge that he had no way of knowing in advance might be con-
sidered unfair.
Palmateer and Harless also do not delineate the contours of a
discharged employee's cause of action. Instead of clearly defining
the parameters of an unlawful discharge, these decisions delved
into what Justice Ryan called "the nebulous area of judicially cre-
expose an employer to a lawsuit every time he discharges an employee with a contract
terminable at will. Under the Monge rule, such a contract is transformed into a hybrid
contract under which the employee cannot be discharged unless his work is unsatisfac-
tory or his services are no longer needed. The Monge court resolved the issue by rewrit-
ing the employment contract so that an employee cannot be fired except for cause. In
that way, the Monge decision is a substitute for a union collective bargaining
agreement.
Id. at 703.
119. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, -, 421 N.E.2d 876,
881 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
120. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
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ated public policy. ' 121 In upholding the employee's cause of action,
Palmateer relied on the general criminal statutes of the state.
Harless focused on a particular statute, the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act. Both decisions essentially held
that general public policy dictates that citizens be encouraged to
support enforcement of the state's laws and therefore, that em-
ployers should be prohibited from firing their employees for con-
duct aimed at preventing violation of state statutes.
Petermann and Frampton, on the other hand, limited the ex-
ceptions to the employment at will doctrine to legislatively articu-
lated public policy. Petermann held that an employer could not
discharge an employee for refusing to commit perjury. Unlike
Petermann, in neither Palmateer nor Harless was the employee
asked to violate any criminal statute. Frampton held that an em-
ployer could not fire an employee who filed a claim under the
workers' compensation act. In Palmateer and Harless the statutes
relied upon protected the public generally and were not designed
to affect the employer-employee relationship specifically. By limit-
ing the employee's cause of action to discharges that violate a clear
statutory provision or that result from the exercise of a statutorily
created right, Petermann and Frampton put employers and em-
ployees on definite notice of what constitutes an unjust discharge.
The Nees and Reuther decisions arguably are also examples of
judicial creation of public policy. Both Nees and Reuther held that
employers could not discharge employees who fulfilled their duty
of serving on a jury because such dismissals violate a "recognized
facet of public policy. ' 12 2 Clearly these cases did not involve the
sort of discharges involved in Petermann and Frampton since
neither employee was asked to violate any statute or prevented
from exercising a statutory right. Nevertheless, both Nees and
Reuther relied on state constitutional and legislative guidance. The
Nees court carefully cited legislation creating exemptions and ex-
cuses from jury duty. By negative implication this legislation had
determined that persons called for jury duty who did not fall
within one of the exempt or excused categories must report for
jury duty. Nees, therefore, merely enforced the legislatively deter-
mined public policy. Moreover, both Nees and Reuther cited statu-
tory provisions subjecting persons who failed to report for jury
121. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, -, 421 N.E.2d 876, 881
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
122. Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 33, 386 A.2d 119, 121
(1978).
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duty to fines. Neither case articulated the argument, but both
courts could have relied on Petermann and held that employers
would not be permitted to threaten discharge in order to coerce
employee conduct that is subject to judicial sanctions. Although
the Nees and Reuther courts reached appropriate results, neither
court clearly identified the legislative policy that justified the ex-
ception they applied. Despite their failure to carefully explain the
basis for their decisions, both courts correctly refrained from creat-
ing their own exceptions to the terminable at will doctrine.
Judicially created exceptions to the terminable at will doctrine
without clear bases in legislatively articulated public policy create
uncertainty because an employer cannot be assured that a court
will not, in hindsight, decide that an employee's conduct was in the
best interests of the state and, therefore, favored by public policy.
Expansive decisions, such as Monge, Fortune, Palmateer, and
Harless, have invited employees to bring actions charging that
their discharge violated some state public policy. Under existing
guidelines, the boundaries of these actions are defined only by the
imagination of the plaintiff's attorneys. 123
B. Vexatious Lawsuits
Judicial expansion of the public policy exception to the em-
ployment at will doctrine could subject employers to vexatious
lawsuits. 24 At least three factors contribute to this possible result.
First, decisions such as Monge, Fortune, Palmateer, and Harless
have expanded the public policy exception to afford relief to em-
ployees whom the courts subjectively think need protection. Dis-
charged at will employees in the private sector who are not pro-
tected by collective bargaining agreements or statutes are thus
encouraged to bring suits.
Second, the uncertainty 12 5 created by Monge and its progeny
may spawn vexatious lawsuits. After Monge, Fortune, Palmateer,
and Harless, an employer cannot be certain that a discharge is free
from judicial challenge. Under the Monge rationale an employee
may claim that his discharge was motivated by bad faith, malice,
or retaliation and, therefore, is not in the interest of the public
good. After Fortune the discharged employee may simply allege
123. See, e.g., Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960), in
which plaintiff argued that serving on a jury came under the protection of legislation
preventing employers from firing employees for their political activity.
124. See Blades, supra note 9, at 1428.
125. See notes 119-23 supra and accompanying text.
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bad faith on the part of the employer. In jurisdictions following
Palmateer and Harless an employer has no clear standards to
guide him in evaluating whether an employee's conduct serves
some judicially conceived public policy. The resulting uncertainty
sets up the employer as an easy target of fired employees and ex-
poses him to the continual threat of suit for wrongful discharge.
Last, because, as in Monge and Fortune, an employee can
fairly easily raise a factual question that places the determination
of liability before the jury, and because the employer often fears
the jury's tendency to side with the employee, vexatious claims
from discharged employees are encouraged. Defendant employers
will often settle claims that they believe have little merit rather
than risk an adverse finding by a jury.126 The employee's motiva-
tion to bring suit and the employer's willingness to settle out of
court are especially heightened in those jurisdictions that recognize
the employee's action in tort rather than contract and thus subject
the employer to possible punitive damages. 12 7
C. Economic Impact
Courts that have expanded the public policy exception may
have failed to consider the economic impact of their decisions.
Monge and its progeny ignored the "legitimate interest of employ-
ers in hiring and retaining the best personnel available. '128 Courts
that fail to adopt a clearly defined standard or that demonstrate a
readiness to expand upon legislatively articulated public policy
create a situation in which employers might be inhibited from crit-
ically evaluating their employees because of the constant threat of
litigation. This situation is especially troublesome when managerial
or salaried employees are the subject of review because, in contrast
to the wage earner whose performance generally can be measured
by an objective standard, upper echelon employees are often judg-
ed by more intangible qualities such as imagination, initiative,
drive, and personality.1 29 Professor Blades thus warned,
The employer's evaluation of the higher ranking employee is usually a highly
personalized, intuitive judgment, and, as such, is more difficult to translate
into concrete reasons which someone else-a juryman-can readily under-
stand and appreciate.... Compromise of the employer's power to make
126. See notes 114-17 supra and accompanying text.
127. See note 13 supra.
128. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, -, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974)
(salesman dismissed for complaints about safety of a new product).
129. See Blades, supra note 9, at 1428-29.
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such judgments about professional, managerial or other high-ranking employ-
ees . . . is especially undesirable.8 0
Whether the particular employee occupies a high position in
the company or is a lower level wage earner, the inhibiting factor
caused by the threat of possible litigation will be present to some
degree whenever an employer considers discharging an employee.
Thus, a consideration of the merits of the Monge, Fortune,
Palmateer, and Harless decisions should examine the extent to
which an employer will be compelled to tolerate subpar perform-
ance longer than he otherwise would. The court should consider
whether the increased hesitancy to fire an employee will lead to a
drop in production efficiency and a corresponding increase in cost
that the public must bear or, alternatively, whether it will create
more job security and thereby result in increased production and
lower costs."' 1 Several courts have expressed their unwillingness to
infringe upon the employer's business judgment in this area.132
These courts have correctly concluded that such policy determina-
tions, with potentially important economic ramifications, should be
left to the legislature.
Two other economic implications of judicial expansion of the
public policy exception to the terminable at will doctrine warrant
examination. First, courts should consider the effect such expan-
sion would have on the small employer. Most commentators who
call for judicial reform to protect employees focus on the individ-
ual employee working for the industrial giant.13 3 These commenta-
tors have ignored the plight of the small businessman. Because
smaller companies employ fewer people and because their success
often depends upon a few key individuals, these companies will es-
pecially be hurt if their ability to critically evaluate their work
force is impaired. This dilemma of the small business is exacer-
bated if the jurisdiction recognizes an action in tort because unlim-
ited punitive damages could bankrupt these companies.13 4 Second,
courts should be aware that if employers perceive that their inde-
pendence is unduly hampered by the law of a particular state, they
130. Id.
131. See Note, supra note 1, at 1834-35 & nn.97-102 (arguing that increased produc-
tion and lower costs will result).
132. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976),
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlM. 2d 124, -, 421 N.E.2d 876, 885 (1981);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, _, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974).
133. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
134. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Il1. 2d 172, 192, 384 N.E.2d 353, 362 (1979) (Un-
derwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230 [Vol. 35:201
RIGHT TO TERMINATE
will be discouraged from locating in that state. Courts asked to
adopt the public policy exception and to determine its parameters
should defer such a decision to the legislature, rather than judi-
cially adopt a standard that could contribute to a declining busi-
ness environment.135
V. A PROPOSED APPROACH
To avoid the disadvantages that often result from an overly
broad cause of action for wrongful discharge, the courts should ar-
ticulate clearly those instances in which an employee will be
granted a cause of action. Clearly articulated standards, however,
cannot be achieved if the courts rely upon vague public policy ex-
ceptions in order to grant a discharged employee's cause of ac-
tion."3 ' The courts should narrow this exception by carefully defin-
ing those circumstances that will give rise to an employee's claim.
Courts addressing this issue should follow Petermann, Frampton,
and Nees and deny a discharged employee's claim unless he was
fired for refusing to violate a constitutional or statutory provision,
for exercising a constitutional or statutory right, or for fulfilling a
constitutionally or legislatively created duty. This standard pro-
vides both employees and employers with notice of what consti-
tutes grounds for discharge of an employee terminable at will.
Moreover, this approach recognizes the legitimate interests of both
the employer and the employee. Because exceptions to the employ-
ment at will doctrine, articulated by state and federal constitutions
and statutes, are recognized by the courts, the employee's job se-
curity is protected. Similarly, under this approach the employer
may critically evaluate his workforce and discharge unproductive
or inefficient employees with clearly defined standards of the em-
ployment at will contract as his guide.137 Defined standards also
135. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, -, 421 N.E.2d 876, 885-
86 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
136. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977), in which
the court stated, "'Public policy is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which its
application may not be disputed. . . .' We hold that this is too vague a concept to justify
the creation of such a new tort. Such creations are best left to the legislature." Id. at 1131
(quoting Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27
(1959).
137. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). "Em-
ployees will be secure in knowing that their jobs are safe if they exercise their rights in
accordance with a clear mandate of public policy. On the other hand, employers will know
that unless they act contrary to public policy, they may discharge employees at will for any
reason." Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 512.
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will discourage disgruntled employees from bringing vexatious law-
suits138 and ensure that the courts' time is spent on "cases involv-
ing truly significant matters of clear and well-defined public policy
and substantial violations thereof."139 Furthermore, by limiting the
scope of employees' potential causes of action to circumstances
within the Petermann, Frampton, and Nees rationale the courts
guarantee that they are enforcing the state's public policy as ar-
ticulated by its constitution and legislature. One judge or a handful
of judges should not delve into the "nebulous area of judicially cre-
ated public policy." °0
Some commentators argue that the courts should intervene
because legislatures are unlikely to be as sensitive to the needs of
unorganized labor as to the needs of highly organized and influen-
tial business.1 4 1 This argument, however, ignores widespread legis-
lation already enacted to benefit labor. Congress and state legisla-
tures have actively sought to protect workers from wrongful
discharge. 4 2 For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohib-
its discrimination in employment based on race, creed, nationality,
and sex.14 3 Under the National Labor Relations Act1 44 employers
may not fire employees for union organizing activity. The Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act 4 5 and the Fair Labor Standards
Act 146 make it illegal for employers to terminate employees for ex-
ercising rights created by those statutes. Other federal statutes
such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967147 and
the Consumer Credit Protection Act 4 8 afford protection for more
specific discharges. At the state level many legislatures have passed
statutes prohibiting discharges because of physical handicaps,"9
for serving on jury duty, 50 for refusing to take a lie detector
138. "[O]ur holding protects the interests of the public in stability of employment and
in elimination of frivolous lawsuits." Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 512.
139. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, -, 421 N.E.2d 876, 885
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 881.
141. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 6; Job Security, supra note 9.
142. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
144. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1976).
145. Id. § 660(c) (1976).
146. Id. § 215(a)(3) (1976).
147. Id. § 623(a) (1976).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976).
149. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, §
34K (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, Subd. 1(2) (West Supp. 1981).
150. For a collection of state laws, see [1980] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws) 1
43,035, 43,055.
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test,151 and for filing a workers' compensation claim. 152
Critics who argue that legislatures are not adequately respon-
sive to the needs of unorganized workers also ignore the success of
labor in several countries that have adopted national legislation to
protect employees who would otherwise be terminable at will.
These countries include France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom.'5 3 In the United Kingdom, for example,
an employer can dismiss an employee only for reasons that relate
to ability to perform the work involved, for reasons related to the
conduct of the employee, or for "some other substantial reason of a
kind such as to justify the dismissal.' 54 Unless the employee has
engaged in gross misconduct, he must be given notice of the dis-
missal.' 55 A fair hearing must then follow and the employee is enti-
tled to know the specific charges against him. The employee may
also be accompanied by a representative of his choice, and he must
be given the opportunity to defend himself.'56 Employees must
have advance notice of conduct that will result in discipline and
the offenses charged must be the real reason for the dismissal.'5 7 If
the employee is found guilty of the offense, the penalty of dismis-
sal, rather than a lesser form of discipline, must be warranted. 15 If
the employee is dissatisfied with the results of these procedures he
may appeal to the National Industrial Relations Court.15 9
If the time has come for reform to protect employees termina-
ble at will, it is for the legislatures, and not the courts, to balance
151. Id. 43,055.
152. Id. See, e.g., TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1981).
153. Job Security, supra note 9, at 698 n.8. See also Peck, supra note 6, at 10-13;
Summers, supra note 9, at 508-19.
154. Summers, supra note 9, at 514 (quoting the Industrial Relations Act 1971, §
24(2)(a), 41 HAL. STAT. 2062 (1971 Comp.)).
155. Id. at 513.
156. Id. at 514-15.
157. Id. at 514.
158. Id. at 515.
159. Id. at 514. See also International Labor Organization Recommendation No. 119
concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, the English ver-
sion of which is reprinted in Comparative Labor Law and Law of the Employment Rela-
tion, A Symposium, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 233, 449 (1964). The Recommendation proposed
that dismissal should only be allowed if the reason for the discharge went to the ability of
the worker to perform the work or the worker's conduct. Id. An opportunity to appeal to a
designated body should be provided. Id. at 450. If the appellate body finds the dismissal
unwarranted, the Recommendation suggests that the body be authorized to order reinstate-
ment, back pay, or other appropriate relief. Id. The Recommendation, however, cautioned
that the appellate body should not interfere with any determination of the size of the work
force. Id. See also Report of the Technical Meeting Concerning Certain Aspects of Indus-
trial Relations Inside Untertakings, 23 INDUSTRY & LAB. 224, 239-40 (1960).
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the interests of the employer, the employee, and society in making
this decision. Nevertheless, most of the changes that have occurred
in the employment at will doctrine have occurred as the result of
judicial action. When called upon to consider the parameters of the
public policy exception to the doctrine, courts should take heed of
Justice Ryan's warning:
By departing from the general rule that an at-will employment is termi-
nable at the discretion of the employer, the courts are attempting to give
recognition to the desire and expectation of an employee in continued em-
ployment. In doing so, however, the courts should not concentrate solely on
promoting the employee's expectations. The courts must recognize that the
allowance of [an action] is a departure from, and an exception to, the general
rule. The legitimate interest of the employer in guiding the policies and
destiny of his operation cannot be ignored. The new [cause of action] is in its
infancy. In nurturing and shaping this remedy, courts must balance the inter-
ests of employee and employer with the hope of fashioning a remedy that will
accommodate the legitimate expectations of both. In the process of emerging
from the harshness of the former rule, we must guard against swinging the
pendulum to the opposite extreme.18 0
VI. CONCLUSION
The general rule that an employment contract of indefinite
duration is terminable at will has received severe criticism in the
past twelve years. In an effort to protect employees some courts
have extended the exception to the terminable at will doctrine be-
yond legislatively articulated public policy without considering the
possible effects such an expansion could have on employers. The
interests of employers, employees, and society are affected when a
court seeks to extend the reach of the public policy exception.
These interests should be balanced to accommodate these con-
cerns. This goal can be achieved if courts limit the public policy
exception to instances in which an employee is discharged for re-
fusing to violate a constitutional or statutory provision, for exercis-
ing a constitutional or statutory right, or for fulfilling a constitu-
tionally or legislatively created duty. These parameters are based
on clearly articulated legislative judgment. Courts, therefore,
should confine the public policy exception to these areas and await
further legislative determination of the limits on an employer's
right to terminate at will.
CHARLES A. BRAKE, JR.
160. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, -, 421 N.E.2d 876, 884
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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